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Bionote 
Sam Browse is a senior lecturer in English Language at Sheffield Hallam 
University. He is the author of Cognitive Rhetoric: The Cognitive Poetics of 
Political Discourse (2018, John Benjamins). His work explores the stylistics 
of political discourse and can be divided into two main areas of activity: 
analysing the discourse of post-truth and the language of the British left, 
and, more broadly, the development of audience or reader-centred 
approaches to political text and talk. 
Chapter Title Straight talking honest politics: rhetorical style and ethos in the mediated 
politics of metamodernity 
 
Abstract 
The leader of the British Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, is known for his ‘straight talking, 
honest politics’ (indeed, this was the slogan for his first leadership campaign). This chapter 
examines the rhetorical construction of authenticity in three videos taken from his official 
YouTube channel.  
Some journalists (e.g. Toynbee, 2016) have suggested that the socialist politician’s 
leadership of the party is symptomatic of the new ‘post-truth’ politics, a political culture in 
which the rhetorical appeals from ethos and pathos trump those from logos (Browse, 2017: 
168). Scholars have pointed to the effect of online media in accelerating this recalibration of 
what constitutes legitimate argument (Harsin, 2015). This chapter argues that while the term 
‘post-truth’ does capture a shift in the kinds of legitimacy claims made by contemporary 
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politicians, it does not adequately explain their causes. Here, they are instead accounted for 
within the theoretical framework of ‘metamodernism’, which describes the renewed emphasis 
on “depth” and authenticity in the cultural and political sphere resulting from the economic, 
political and environmental crises of the 2000s (see van den Akker et al, 2017).  
Using critical stylistics (Jeffries, 2010) in combination with Chatman’s (1990) notion 
of the ‘cinematic narrator’, the analyses investigate how the Labour leader and his party’s 
appeal to authenticity are styled in the videos. Three strategies are identified – Corbyn’s use 
of populist rhetoric, his allocentric curation of “ordinary” people’s experiences, and the 
curation of his ethos by others – and these are linked to the renewed sense of historicity, 
depth and affect that characterise metamodernity. The chapter therefore offers a critical 
stylistic reading of the socialist politician’s performance of authenticity which is situated with 
respect to the contemporary metamodern political and media context. 
 
Straight talking honest politics: rhetorical style and ethos in the mediated 
politics of metamodernity 
1. Introduction 
In 2015, The Guardian journalist, John Harris, was standing outside a community centre in 
the English town of Luton interviewing a woman who had just attended a political rally. She 
said, ‘after hearing that tonight, he comes across so genuine and just real... I totally believed 
Jeremy Corbyn’ (Guardian, 2015). Following an unexpected defeat in the 2015 election, the 
British Labour Party found itself in the midst of selecting a new leader and Corbyn, the left-
wing veteran and perennial backbencher, was the unlikely frontrunner. Not only did he go on 
to win the contest with 59.5% of the vote, but months later increased his overall majority to 
62% following a second leadership challenge prompted by a rebellion of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. 
 The sentiments expressed by the woman at the rally are shared not only by Corbyn’s 
political allies, but his opponents. When asked whether he thought electors would vote for the 
left-winger, Andy Burnham – a defeated rival for the leadership – said: 
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Well, we’ll have to see won’t we, but, you know, what they do want is politicians of 
conviction, people who say what they mean. They are sick to death of people coming 
on looking like they’re reading off a script. Well, that’s clearly not Jeremy Corbyn. 
(BBC, 2015) 
The politician’s ethos is certainly a salient part of his appeal. Indeed, ‘straight talking honest 
politics’ was the slogan for his first leadership campaign. The focus on the man has led some 
to suggest that his supporters are more like fans (Allington, 2017), while more vitriolic 
commentators have bemoaned the contemporary Labour Party’s ‘cult of Corbyn’ (Cohen, 
2017). This depiction of the irrational Corbyn cultist is sometimes linked to the discourse of 
“post-truth” politics. For example, in an article for The Guardian, after enumerating all the 
ways in which she feels the new Labour leader is unelectable, Polly Toynbee describes her 
experiences of talking to Labour members at the party conference: 
In one fraught conversation after another, I try all this on Corbyn believers but to no 
avail. No compromise, blocked ears, total denial of electoral facts, a post-truth 
conviction. You can hear this non-meeting of minds everywhere at this conference, a 
shutter of incomprehension dividing the two sides. “But we can convince them! 
People will listen!” They do think Corbyn will be the next prime minister, because 
conviction moves mountains. These are likable people, and I envy their certainty – the 
way you can envy the religious their delusions. 
(Toynbee, 2016, my emphasis) 
The first use of the term ‘post-truth’ is often traced back to Keyes’ (2004) The Post-Truth 
Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life. The book argued that the value of 
truth in American society and culture is in decline. In a 2010 article for the environmental 
news and opinion website, Grist, David Roberts repurposed the concept, using it to describe 
‘a political culture in which politics (public opinion and media narratives) have become 
almost entirely disconnected from policy (the substance of legislation)’. Since then, 
journalistic writing has proliferated on the issue (book-length recent examples include, Ball 
2017; D’Ancona, 2017; Davis, 2017; and McIntyre, 2018). This has triggered further 
discussion of the term in a variety of different academic contexts including anthropology 
(Mair, 2017), communication (Hannan, 2018) and cultural studies (Harsin, 2015, 2018), 
philosophy (Tallis, 2016), cognitive psychology (Lewandowsky et al, 2017; Munoz, 2017), 
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politics (Fish, 2016) and stylistics (Browse, 2017). Journalistic and academic writing on the 
subject proceed from very similar premises. Both converge on two central claims relating 
respectively to the production and reception of political discourse. 
 The first is that the rhetorical practices of mainstream politicians have changed for the 
worse. Post-truth rhetoric represents the unwelcome triumph of appeals to ethos and pathos 
over logos; the archetypal post-truth politician is anti-establishment, plain-speaking, gutsy 
and authentic (Browse, 2017: 168). These rhetorical shifts are not only a matter of style, but 
of content. Sismondo (2017: 3) argues that according to ‘the rules of the game in democratic 
contexts, politicians generally only bend the truth’; now, though, we have entered an epoch in 
which public figures tell outright lies, make claims that cannot be verified, or promises that 
cannot feasibly be kept.  
The second claim is that not only politicians, but their audiences, have come to value 
their emotions and sense of identity over rational debate and “facts”. This is often 
accompanied by arguments relating to the proliferation of “fake news”, the decline and 
erosion of trust in traditional media institutions, and the pernicious effects of social media 
(see especially Hannan, 2017, on the latter). One of the key causes of this shift is said to be 
the digitally mediated nature of contemporary political discourse (Harsin, 2006: 87; 2015). 
For instance, the distribution and circulation of fake news is aided by the ‘attention economy’ 
of the internet and the predictive analytics that produce social media content (Harsin, 2015: 
330). These algorithmic processes create so-called “filter bubbles” – social-media echo-
chambers in which users are provided with content based on what they have previously read 
or shared (Pariser, 2011). The result is to reinforce already held beliefs and opinions, 
entrench ideological divisions, and accelerate the circulation of fake news stories (although 
see Flaxman et al, 2016; Kelly Garrett, 2009; Prior, 2013). Lewandowsky et al (2017: 360) 
outline the social consequences of this dynamic, arguing that ‘we are now facing a situation 
in which a large share of the populace is living in an epistemic space that has abandoned 
conventional criteria of evidence, internal consistency, and fact-seeking’. Political realities 
are instead defined by the self-reinforcing circulation of content in social networks that are 
hermetically sealed from rival ideological perspectives. Thus, Toynbee describes ‘a shutter of 
incomprehension dividing the two sides’ and the ‘no compromise, blocked ears, total denial 
of electoral facts [and] post-truth conviction’ of Jeremy Corbyn supporters.     
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 This chapter takes a critical stylistic perspective on political discourse (see Browse, 
2018; Jeffries, 2010), the issues raised by the post-truth critique and what they mean for an 
analysis of Corbyn’s rhetorical style. ‘Critical’ in this context means ‘making visible the 
interconnectedness of things’ (Fairclough, 1985: 747) – tracing the dialectical relationships 
between individual interactions, the institutions in which those interactions take place, and 
the overarching social formations in which those institutions are located (Fairclough, 1985: 
747-748). Whilst an analysis of technological infrastructure is an important part of this, the 
trends in the production and reception of political discourse outlined above should not be 
divorced from their wider social, economic and political context. In this chapter, I describe 
this wider context through the lens of metamodernism (Vermeulen and van den Akker, 2010, 
2015; and van den Akker et al, 2017), situating the rhetorical performances of Corbyn, and 
the party that he leads, within this broader heuristic. In Section 2, following van den Akker et 
al (2017), I outline the key features of metamodernity. Section 3 describes the data used to 
exemplify the metamodern trends in Corbyn’s rhetorical performances – three videos from 
his public YouTube channel – alongside the stylistic frameworks employed to operationalise 
this metamodern perspective in the analyses of the online broadcasts. Section 4 examines the 
way that the Labour leader uses a populist rhetorical style to perform authenticity in the 
videos, and Section 5 investigates how this left populism involves curating the apparently 
authentic experiences of British electors for his viewers in order to make tacit appeals to his 
ethos. The chapter concludes by discussing the relationship of these metamodern rhetorical 
strategies to the journalistic and academic discourse on ‘post-truth’.          
2. Metamodernity: The ‘revenge’ of history and return of depth and affect 
‘Metamodernism’ is a term primarily associated with cultural criticism (see, for example 
Vermeulen and van den Akker, 2010, 2015; and van den Akker et al, 2017), although it has 
also been used in discussion of contemporary political rhetoric (see Browse, 2017). 
Following Raymond Williams (1977), van den Akker and Vermeulen (2017) describe 
metamodernism as a ‘structure of feeling’ – a historically situated and socially shared 
affective state or “mood” that is manifest in the cultural production of the era. They suggest 
that ‘historically, metamodernism is tied to a moment after postmodernism in the sense that it 
has developed from and displaces postmodernism as the dominant cultural logic of Western 
capitalist societies’ (van den Akker and Vermeulen, 2017: 11). Using Frederic Jameson’s 
(1991) tripartite conceptualisation of postmodernism as a ‘cultural dominant’, they describe 
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the metamodern structure of feeling along three axes – historicity, depth and affect – using 
these descriptors to contrast post- and metamodernity. 
2.1 Historicity: the revenge of history 
The first dimension of van den Akker et al’s (2017) Jameson-inspired theorisation of 
metamodernity is historicity. After the defeat of communism, Francis Fukuyama (1989) 
famously proclaimed ‘the end of history’ – the idea that major questions about how to 
organise society had been settled with the triumph of capitalist liberal democracy. Politically, 
not only would the victory of the West have consequences for revolutionary Marxists, it 
would also result in a global reconfiguration of the centre-left in the form of ‘Third Way’ 
social democracy. The particular expression of this global movement in Britain – the context 
relevant to my analysis of Corbynite rhetoric – was Tony Blair’s New Labour, which 
combined a liberal attitude to matters of race, gender and sexuality, an embrace of market 
reforms in the provision of public services, and an ever closer alignment of British foreign 
policy interests with the US State Department (the last of these culminating in Blair’s strident 
support for the war in Iraq). Whilst the New Labour government delivered downward 
redistribution of wealth in the form of tax credits, in its essentials it continued the pro-market 
reforms of the previous Conservative governments (Blackburn, 2018). Indeed, on the 
occasion of Thatcher’s death, Blair (2013) himself said ‘I always thought my job was to build 
on some of the things she had done rather than reverse them’. Thus, ‘the end of history’ 
signified the hegemony of neoliberal ideology across the political spectrum. Gordon Brown, 
chancellor for the New Labour government, even claimed to have vanquished the rhythm of 
up- and downturns that are fundamental to the economic cycle, repeatedly proclaiming an end 
to “boom and bust”. It was this sense of having reached a cultural, political and economic 
endpoint that marked the – hubristic – postmodern structure of feeling. 
Van den Akker and Vermeulen (2017: 12) argue that there has been a gradual 
transition from this perspective, starting in the late 90s at around the time of the Seattle 
demonstrations against globalisation, continuing through the 2000s, and finishing at the end 
of the decade. This new metamodern cultural sens ‘reboots’ the progress of history (van den 
Akker and Vermeulen, 2017: 2). The 2007/8 economic crash, the relative decline of US-led 
imperialism, the rise of China predicated on an alternative social and economic model, and 
the impending global environmental crisis, all point to significant structural failures in 
Western-style capitalism. However, unlike the Cold War, which entailed an ideological 
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competition resulting in only one of two possible outcomes (the victory of East or West), 
what happens next is now very much up for debate. It is this which causes van den Akker and 
Vermeulen (2017: 2) to suggest that we face a “bend” in the road ahead beyond which we 
cannot see. Thus the new metamodern structure of feeling involves a felt sense of progress, 
but with no corresponding totalising ideological perspective through which it might be 
rationalised. 
 The rebooting of history is more evocatively described by Corbyn’s director of 
communications, Seumas Milne (2012), as its ‘revenge’. Although inequality widened, the 
protracted economic upturn of the 2000s did allow successive Labour governments to 
advance the living standards of the majority whilst – as one British politician put it – being 
‘intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich’ (Mandelson, 1999). The global economic 
crash of 2007/8 brought the “long boom” of the previous decade to an abrupt and dramatic 
end. Under pressure to adopt a fiscally ‘responsible’ economic policy from the opposition 
Conservative Party, the Labour Party, now led by Gordon Brown, opted to pursue its own 
weaker version of austerity and duly lost the 2010 general election. Brown’s successor, Ed 
Miliband, continued in this vein, pledging not to exceed the overall Conservative Party 
spending envelope. While Miliband presided over a small reversal in Labour’s electoral 
fortunes, he also failed to secure a general election victory. It was in the aftermath of this 
defeat that Corbyn took the reins of the party. A long-time backbencher and lieutenant of the 
former leader of the Labour left, Tony Benn, he had resisted the Party’s embrace of Third 
Way politics since their inception. As chair of the Stop the War Coalition, he was one of the 
leaders of the British movement against the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also led vocal 
opposition to the 2010-2015 Conservative-led coalition government’s austerity policies, 
speaking on numerous marches and demonstrations. His election to the leadership of the 
Labour Party therefore represented a decisive break with the political perspective which had 
dominated for the previous twenty years. 
2.2. The Return of depth and affect 
The ‘revenge’ or ‘return’ of history has had consequences for contemporary aesthetics. This 
has resulted in the closely entangled second and third lines of difference between post- and 
metamodernity. They relate to the status of affect in cultural production, and the linked 
notions of depth and surface. The modernist sense of historical progression brought with it a 
corresponding impetus for individual self-realisation and improvement. High modernism, 
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Jameson (1991: 12) suggests, thus involved the ‘desperate communication and the outward 
dramatization of inward feeling’. Artwork from this period invites us to look beyond the 
surface of the canvas to an expressive reality behind it. For instance, Van Gogh’s vivid 
depiction of peasant shoes is evocative of a lived experience beyond the picture with which 
we are invited to identify or empathise. 
 Conversely, Jameson (1991: 15) suggests that the dissolution of a centred, modernist 
self in the ‘organisational bureaucracy’ of late capitalism has engendered a depthless, self-
referential quality in postmodern art. Whereas Van Gogh gestures towards something outside 
the picture frame, in Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes, the assorted footwear is stripped from its 
real world context, rendered in block colours on a black canvas like a colour photocopy or, as 
Gibbons (2017: 83) suggests, a photographic negative. The image consequently ‘no longer 
speaks to us with the immediacy of Van Gogh’s footgear’ (Jameson, 1991: 8). Jameson 
(1991: 10) calls this rejection of any gesture towards an external emotional realm ‘the waning 
of affect’ in postmodern cultural production. 
 The new metamodern structure of feeling, on the other hand, heralds the return of 
affect and depth in culture. If the high-modernist project endeavoured to communicate an 
interior subjectivity and affectivity which postmodernism rejected, this return ‘should be 
understood as a desperate but wishful attempt to think, feel and perceive historically, 
spatially and corporeally’ (Vermeulen, 2017: 149, my emphasis). The contemporary 
orientation to affect and depth, then, is governed by two contradictory impulses: the 
(‘desperate but wishful’) gesture towards an emotional reality beyond a surface, and 
ambivalence about whether such a deeper reality exists. This oscillation is captured in 
Vermeulen’s (2015, 2017) concept of ‘depthiness’: 
Depthiness… is the establishment of depth not as a shared epistemological reality but 
as one among many personally performed (im)possibilities – which is, to be sure, not 
to say they cannot be shared, but rather that they are by no means necessarily shared. 
(Vermeulen, 2017: 149) 
The emphasis, here, is not on the reality beyond the surface performance, but on the 
performance itself; that is, what matters is that depth is affected, even if the emotional reality 
being gestured towards is illusory. 
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 This depthiness arguably finds expression in contemporary patterns of consumption. 
Postmodernist art had celebrated Baudrillard’s (1983) ‘procession of simulacra’ – the mass 
production of commodities which were all copies of copies, having no original (Warhol’s 
paintings of Campbell’s soup tins are the more famous examples). In contrast, metamodernity 
has brought with it an ‘aritisanal turn’ (van Tuinen, 2017) in which the history of the 
commodity – the craftwork that has gone into making it – runs at a premium. This is 
particularly pronounced in the food industry, as witnessed in the booming sales of craft beers, 
for example (so, according to the Brewer’s Association [2017], last year in the US sales grew 
by 5% - more than any other type of beer). Even the fast-food colossus, McDonalds, is 
running adverts explaining the origins of the beef used in their burgers (they are ‘100% 
British and Irish Beef’, [McDonalds, 2016]). This artisan culture of consumption has perhaps 
given rise to the contemporary social stereotype of “the hipster” – a person whose purchasing 
patterns are such that they always own the most authentic products bought from the most 
skilled producers. As in postmodernism, identity is indexed through consumer choices, but 
the choices themselves are saturated with an artisan ethos which conveys upon the consumer 
a sense of depthiness. Thus, the hipster performs depth by curating a set of commodity-
artefacts that are imbued with historicity and authenticity. In Section 5, I explore the 
relationship between curation and authenticity in greater depth insofar as it pertains to 
Corbyn’s rhetorical style.  
3. Analysing metamodern style in videos from Jeremy Corbyn’s YouTube 
Channel 
The metamodern conceptual framework outlined above provides a theoretical prism through 
which to view the political and economic context of Corbynite political discourse (Milne’s 
[2012] ‘revenge of history’), and the rhetorical emphasis on the Labour leader’s ethos 
highlighted in the introduction of this chapter (the return of depth and affect in contemporary 
cultural production and new forms of curated authenticity this has engendered). The 
following sections apply these concepts to an analysis of three videos from the socialist 
politician’s personal YouTube channel. The videos were chosen because they are some of the 
most viewed by visitors to the channel. It is therefore reasonable to expect that these play an 
important role in the construction of Corbyn’s seemingly authentic persona.  
 The first analysis investigates the Labour leader’s rhetorical construction of 
authenticity with respect to the renewed sense of historicity characterising the contemporary 
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metamodern zeitgeist (see Section 2.1, above). Part of the ‘revenge of history’ described by 
Milne (2012) is Corbyn’s insurgent left-wing anti-austerity politics – a politics which pits 
itself against the mainstream political perspective of the previous three decades. Corbynism 
can thus be seen as a form of left populism which involves the rhetorical construction of the 
people versus the elite (Schoor, 2017). Indeed, this rhetorical strategy is perhaps best 
exemplified in the Labour campaign slogan, ‘for the many, not the few’. The analysis of the 
first video outlines the stylistic means by which the socialist politician creates this rhetorical 
division and the tacit appeal to his ethos it involves. The approach taken is eclectic and 
holistic (Carter and Stockwell, 2008: 300, see also Jeffries, 2000) insofar as it examines how 
a number of different linguistic features are combined to create the populist style of the video. 
These include the Labour leader’s pronominal choices, his use of naming strategies (Jeffries, 
2010), verbs with negative prosody, modality (Simpson, 1993), grammatical ambiguity, and 
impoliteness strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1981). The second and third analyses examine 
the concept of ‘curated authenticity’ (see Section 2.2, above) in the party leader’s videos. To 
operationalise this concept, I focus on the visual and musical elements of the videos using 
Chatman’s (1990) notion of the cinematic narrator. To avoid lengthy exposition, here, I 
provide a more detailed exposition of Chatman’s (1990) approach in Section 5.1, below. The 
analyses, then, provide an account of both the linguistic, visual and auditory strategies used in 
the videos to construct Corbyn’s rhetorical appeal to authenticity.    
4. Corbyn, populism and the revenge of history 
A good example of the left populism characterising the revenge of history is a video 
broadcast from Corbyn’s YouTube channel called ‘Bankers like Morgan Stanley should not 
run our country’. The video, released on 30
th
 November 2017, was issued in response to a 
press release by the banking giant named in its title. It has been viewed just under 32,000 
times. The bank had suggested that a Corbyn-led government would be a worse threat to 
business than Britain leaving the EU. The video featured a head and shoulders shot of Corbyn 
standing in what appears to be his parliamentary office. This is the transcript of what he says: 
Bankers like Morgan Stanley should not run our country but they think they do 
because the party they fund and protects their interests, the Conservative Party, is in 
Downing Street. That’s why they want to keep the Tories there, because their rigged 
economy and their tax cuts for the richest work for them. These are the same 
speculators and gamblers who crashed our economy in 2008 and then we had to bail 
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them out. Their greed plunged the world into crisis and we’re still paying the price. 
Because the Tories used the aftermath of the financial crisis to push through 
unnecessary and deeply damaging austerity. That’s meant a crisis in our public 
services, falling wages and the longest decline in living standards for over 60 years. 
Nurses, teachers, shop workers, builders, well, just about everyone is finding it hard to 
get by, while Morgan Stanley’s CEO paid himself £21.5 million last year and UK 
banks paid out £15 billion in bonuses. Labour is a growing movement of well over 
half a million members and a government in waiting that will work for the many. So 
when they say we’re a threat, they’re right. We’re a threat to a damaging and failed 
system that’s rigged for the few.  
Perhaps the most striking thing about the video is the penultimate line ‘so when they say 
we’re a threat, they’re right’. To avoid a politically damaging row with a major bank, one 
might expect an attempt to placate Morgan Stanley and allay their fears. In their discussion of 
face threatening acts (FTAs), Brown and Levinson (1981: 61) suggest ‘it is in general in 
every participant's best interest to maintain each other's face’ because one FTA usually 
engenders another. This is an unusual pragmatic situation because mitigating Morgan 
Stanley’s initial FTA would itself involve a follow-up FTA in which the Labour Party 
disagreed with the bankers’ assessment. This could of course be diminished with a politeness 
strategy (for example, ‘we understand Morgan Stanley’s concerns, but rest assured the 
Labour Party is committed to creating a strong economy which is good for British business’). 
Instead, Corbyn unusually accepts the initial FTA, agreeing with the banking giant’s assertion 
that Labour is a threat. The result is a bald, on-record FTA (Brown and Levinson, 1981: 69) 
which is amplified given the context – British politicians do not usually pick fights with 
major multinational investment banks. It is little wonder, then, that the Labour leader’s retort 
was itself headline news. 
 The aggressive response to the bank’s attack on Labour economic policy is 
legitimised with a populist rhetorical style (see Schoor, 2017) that pits ‘the many’ against an 
elite ‘few’. Corbyn constructs an outgroup consisting of bankers and the Conservative Party, 
referring to this group with the third person plural pronoun ‘they’ throughout the short 
statement, alongside disparaging naming strategies (‘speculators and gamblers’) and 
possessive pronouns which all pre-modify noun phrases with negative prosody (‘their 
interests’, ‘their rigged economy’, ‘their tax cuts for the richest’, ‘their greed’). The 
 12 
government and bankers are even conflated with a grammatical ambiguity; ‘they want to 
keep the Tories there, because their rigged economy and their tax cuts for the richest work for 
them’. The possessive ‘their’ in ‘their rigged economy’ and ‘their tax cuts for the richest’ 
could be ambiguously attributed to either ‘the Tories’ or the bankers, cementing the 
rhetorically constructed relationship between the two. This outgroup is also the subject of 
several dramatic and physically aggressive verbs (‘plunged’, ‘crashed’, ‘pushed through’), 
which all further serve to negatively portray bankers and the Conservatives. In the case of 
‘pushed through’, this evaluation is emphasised through negative premodification of what the 
government have supported, ‘unnecessary and deeply damaging austerity’. 
The ‘they’ of the bankers and the Conservative Party is juxtaposed with a ‘we’ that 
includes people such as ‘Nurses, teachers, shop workers, builders’, ‘just about everyone’, ‘the 
many’ and, later in the video, the Labour Party itself. The construction of this group is 
achieved through the use of the first person plural pronoun, ‘we’ (‘we had to bail them out’, 
‘we’re still paying the price’) and through possessive pronouns (‘our country’, ‘our 
economy’, ‘our public services’). The verbs associated with ‘we’ are both modally shaded 
(Simpson, 1993). ‘Had’ is a deontic modal verb and therefore signals obligation. Less 
straightforwardly, ‘paying the price’, echoes a register of moral accounting – it suggests that 
something should or should not have been done in the past and that someone is suffering the 
consequences of that action now, in the present. As such, it has a deontic modal quality. The 
effect of both verbs is to create a sense in which the positively evaluated ‘we’ is imposed 
upon by the negatively evaluated outgroup – that it has been forced or obliged to do 
something it otherwise would not have done. This counterpoising of the government and the 
bankers with the interests of ‘the many’ is further thrown into relief by the following: 
‘Nurses, teachers, shop workers, builders, well, just about everyone is finding it hard to get 
by, while Morgan Stanley’s CEO paid himself £21.5 million last year and UK banks paid out 
£15 billion in bonuses’. Here, a number of “ordinary” groups of people are listed on the basis 
of their profession. Corbyn finishes this list with the discourse marker ‘well’ – an affected 
disfluency, given the pre-prepared nature of the speech – followed by the final item ‘just 
about everyone’. This achieves two things. First, the list contributes to the construction of a 
‘we’ which includes everyone except bankers and the government. Second, the use of the 
discourse marker, alongside the imprecise qualifier ‘just about’ and the colloquial verb phrase 
‘getting by’, creates an informal persona for the Labour leader. The listing, then, further 
constructs an in-group of ordinary people to whom Corbyn, with his casually styled speech, 
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belongs. This group is contrasted with the CEO of Morgan Stanley in what Jeffries (2010: 58) 
calls an ‘explicit opposition’, signalled by the subordinating conjunction’ while’, thus further 
serving to emphasise the outgroup of elite bankers who profit while everyone else struggles. 
Towards the end of the statement, the party leader introduces a new ‘we’, the referent 
of which is the Labour Party. Like the previous in-group, this new ‘we’ is also opposed to the 
‘rigged’ system and is defined in opposition to the same ‘they’ – the Conservative Party and 
bankers – that feature throughout the speech. The interests of the Labour Party and ‘the 
many’ (for whom Labour are said to work) are consequently aligned. Far from being 
undesirable, then, Corbyn’s ‘threat’ to Morgan Stanley is repositioned as a positive feature of 
his political platform. In threatening the banks, he articulates – in populist fashion – the 
interests of the in-group of ordinary people which he has rhetorically constructed throughout 
the speech. 
As was suggested in the introduction, part of Jeremy Corbyn’s appeal is said to be his 
authentic persona. Throughout the video, and as the stylistic analysis above has detailed, the 
Labour leader consistently positions himself as part of the in-group of ordinary people whose 
interests clash with those of the banking sector. However, authenticity in the video is not only 
performed through this rhetorical positioning. Corbyn’s acceptance that he is, in fact, a threat 
to the banks – his refusal to attempt to play down the FTA issued by Morgan Stanley – is 
perhaps the greatest index of the ‘straight-talking honest politics’ for which he is said to 
stand. Rather than take the face-saving line of least resistance by denying the bank’s 
assertions, he instead uses the criticism to sharpen the populist division between elites and 
ordinary people. That is, his intentionally face-threatening response to the banking 
multinational can itself be interpreted as an appeal to his authentic ethos. 
Whilst the Labour leader’s riposte to Morgan Stanley is unusually forceful, he is not 
the only modern mainstream British politician to have relied upon populism. As Fairclough 
(2000: 115) argues, Tony Blair would often invoke ‘a mythical narrative… of how the leader 
at the moment of assuming leadership enters into a mystical communion with the people’ 
(Fairclough, 2000: 115). Stylistically, this would usually involve the former Prime Minister 
acting as the sensor and electors’ thoughts or feelings the phenomena in a mental process, for 
example ‘I sense that the British people demand…’, ‘I could sense confidence returning’, or 
‘you know what I want’ (see Fairclough, 2000: 115). Notably, though, Blair’s populism was 
egocentric – he intuited the wishes of the struggling demos on the basis of his own political 
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and emotional intelligence. Conversely, rather than an ego who is attuned to the internal 
mental life of a third party, Corbyn’s populism involves positioning himself with a particular 
constituency of electors (in the video discussed above, ‘nurses, teachers, shop workers, 
builders’); he is part of the ‘we’ for whom he speaks. Stylistically, this means that unlike 
Blair he rarely uses the first person pronoun, and even actively avoids speaking about himself 
(see Browse, 2017, for further discussion). Although both Labour leaders use a populist 
rhetorical strategy, then, this is a key difference in how their populisms are styled. To 
examine it further, the next section explores the concept of curated authenticity and the way 
in which it might usefully describe the rhetorical appeal to Corbyn’s ethos. 
5. Curating the authentic in political discourse 
Jeremy Corbyn is obviously not a hipster, but his own appeal to authenticity arguably works 
in a similar manner to these patterns of consumption outlined in Section 2.2. Rather than 
directly appeal to his own ethos, ‘depthiness’ (Vermeulen, 2015, 2017) is achieved through 
the mobilisation of other people’s authentic experiences. A good example of this is his 
approach to Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), for which he will often use apparently 
crowd-sourced questions rather than those he has devised himself. The rhetorical effect of 
this is paradoxical. On the one hand, in the cut and thrust of parliamentary debate, it means 
that the rhetorical appeal from ethos is no longer his but the seemingly ordinary member of 
the public whose question he has selected (which has obvious practical advantages in a 
debate). On the other, the act of self-effacement – choosing to ask someone else’s question 
rather than his own – is itself a tacit appeal to the populist integrity of the Labour politician 
(Browse, 2017: 180-181). Indeed, to return to the comparison with other Labour leaders, 
whereas Blair might emote or utilise aspects of his own personal biography to construct a 
sincere, genuine public persona (Fairclough, 2000; Pearce, 2013), Corbyn tends to actively 
avoid doing so (Browse, 2017: 178-9). I call the Labour leader’s indirect appeal to ethos 
‘curated authenticity’ because it derives from his expert ability to curate these experiences 
and efface his own. The word ‘curate’ is a better descriptor than, say, ‘present’ or ‘represent’, 
as it captures the way in which Corbyn not only relays the everyday struggles of electors, but 
situates them within a wider populist political narrative. For example, in the case of PMQs, 
the questions are integrated into a broader political attack on the Prime Minister which 
coheres with Labour Party policy. Just as the selection and curation of artisan commodities 
indexes “depthiness” in contemporary cultures of consumption, implicitly validating the 
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insight and expertise of the curator, so too does the selection and curation of questions in 
PMQs.  Thus, the left-wing politician’s rhetorical style not only reflects the ‘revenge of 
history’ in the populist division it makes between the people and elites, it also resonates with 
the metamodern performance of depth. The following analyses of two videos from Corbyn’s 
YouTube channel demonstrate this approach to “doing” authenticity. The first analysis 
investigates how the experiences of others are curated in order to construct a rhetorical 
depthiness in Labour election campaigning, and the second the way in which Corbyn is the 
subject of curation by others. 
5.1 Corbyn as the curator of the people’s experiences 
YouTube has a facility for ‘pinning’ videos to a profile. This means that they appear on the 
homepage of the YouTube user. The pinned video on Corbyn’s profile is called ‘For the 
many, not the few’ and, at the time of writing, has been viewed just under 60,000 times. One 
of the most noteworthy features of the broadcast is that it includes no spoken language. 
Rather than its verbal elements, then, what makes it interesting from the perspective of 
examining how Corbyn and the Labour Party curate the experiences of other people is its use 
of cinematic narration (Chatman, 1990). Chatman (1990: 133-134) describes the cinematic 
narrator as follows: ‘films, in my view, are always presented – mostly and often exclusively 
shown, but sometimes partially told – by a narrator or narrators. The overall agent that does 
the showing, I would call the cinematic narrator’. He outlines the semiotic means by which 
cinematic narrators ‘show’ the film in a diagram reproduced in Figure 1. 
Starting at the bottom of the diagram, in the visual channel, the nature of the images 
the viewer sees varies throughout the 1 minute and 45 second video. Rather than telling an 
explicit narrative, the overall broadcast is more like a montage of images, the majority of 
which represent people and landscapes in both urban and countryside settings – from fields of 
wheat and rural villages, to seaside towns, inner-city London suburbs, and commercial 
venues, such as restaurants and garages. In terms of the props they use, their appearance and 
their performances, all the people in the video appear to be authentically going about their 
day-to-day lives. These ‘actors’, to use Chatman’s (1990) term (although the apparent 
authenticity of the people in the film perhaps makes it problematic), all engage in “ordinary” 













Figure 1. Semiotic resources available to the cinematic narrator (from Chatman, 1990: 135) 
 
mechanic, a shop assistant, two skateboarders, gardeners, young people sitting in the park 
(judging by their laptops and open notebooks, they appear to be students), a father and son 
holding hands, nurses, a farmer, a busker, a chef, people in a retirement home, a child running 
down the street, two men in what appears to be a barbers, and a family at the dinner table. 
The montage begins by cycling through these vignettes of normal people going about their 
everyday activities and gradually intersperses these with images of Jeremy Corbyn. The first 
of these appears at 0:32 and is an image of the Labour leader talking to a crowd of people in a 
community hall. In the second, at 0:57, he appears to be joking and laughing with a team of 
nurses. In the third, at 1:01, he shakes hands with a woman on her doorstep. In the fourth, at 
1:07, he is first pictured listening to someone off-camera, which then cuts to him embracing 
and shaking hands with the busker, and then to him talking to a woman on a public bus. The 
fifth, at 1:12, begins with Corbyn stepping off a campaign bus, waving amongst a crowd of 
people. It then changes to an image of him embracing a man with a child on the edge of a 
crowd of supporters, another cut to a very large crowd of Labour supporters, then another to 
him shaking hands with people on his way into a conference hall (presumably the venue for 
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the 2016 Labour Party conference). This switches to an image of party members at the 
conference breaking into applause, another image of the party leader shaking hands with 
those stood in line, followed by images of him talking to a large crowd of people outside and 
then inside a conference hall. The succession of conference and crowd images then shifts to 
Corbyn chatting to residents in a retirement home. At 1:26, the video returns to the montage 
of ordinary people, cutting back to him talking to a woman in a crowd at 1:33, and finishing 
with a shot of the Labour leader in profile staring into the middle distance. The video ends 
with a red screen with the Labour logo, followed by the campaign slogan ‘for the many, not 
the few’. 
 Before commenting in any great detail on the treatment of the images (thus far, I have 
only offered a description of the nature of the images and the editing), the auditory channel of 
the broadcast should be considered because the interrelation of image and sound is important 
for its populist message. The only sound is off-screen, commentative music – Lily Allen’s 
(2013) cover of the Keane song, ‘Somewhere Only We Know’ – which plays throughout. The 
instrumental arrangement of the song is mainly vocals, arpeggiated piano and strings, 
although there are additional percussion parts, including xylophone and cymbals. The lyrics 
and arrangement of the music act in tandem with aspects of the video. The music slows at 
0:31 with the line ‘I’m getting tired and I need someone to rely on’, and pauses at 0:35. This 
is timed to coincide with the first cut to Corbyn and the pause occurs in a moment that the 
Labour leader appears to be delivering quite an impassioned point to his audience (it is a 
close head-shot in profile and he is gesturing emphatically with the back of his hand). 
Clearly, it is the veteran socialist that the viewer is to believe is ‘someone to rely on’ 
(interestingly, too, the persona in the song is ‘getting tired’ which echoes the way in which 
the in-group had been depicted as suffering at the expense of the banker out-group in the 
Morgan Stanley video analysed in the last section). At 1:11, the music then swells with 
cymbals and strings and Allen’s voice rises, which is the moment Corbyn steps off the 
campaign bus to greet a crowd of supporters. Finally, the musical crescendo relaxes at 1:33 
with the line ‘somewhere only we know’. The lyric coincides with an image of the Labour 
leader and the woman talking together in a crowd (see Figure 2a) and is then repeated, this 
time only to piano, xylophone and high-pitched strings, over the image of him staring into the 
middle distance (see Figure 2b). The effect of this is to create an in-group sense of intimacy, 
reflected in the intensity of the discussion he appears to be having with the woman; he is 







Figure 2. Image and music in ‘For the many, not the few’ 
 
lyric mimics this onscreen closeness. Similarly, the close head-shot of Corbyn in Figure 2b 
indexes an intimate relationship with the politician (see Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996); he is 
staring off-screen at ‘somewhere only we know’. 
The video, then, presents a series of quotidian images that represent life in the UK. 
These images are interspersed with those of the Labour leader joking, laughing and talking 
with ordinary people. The soundtrack works with this footage to promote an image of Corbyn 
as someone who can be relied upon and who shares an intimacy with both the people he 
meets onscreen and those watching the video. Perhaps what ties the vignettes of everyday life 
together with the footage of the politician most, however, is the cinematography, specifically 
the way the camera is angled throughout the short film. The images of “normal” people can 
be further divided into two kinds: more naturalistic medium and long shots that capture their 
day-to-day activities (a postman delivering mail, a couple walking their dog, gardeners 
landscaping a garden etc.); and medium or head-and-shoulder shots that depict those people 
facing the camera in portrait fashion, as if they were being interviewed. An exemplary 
selection of this latter viewing arrangement has been provided in Figures 3a-h. All these 
examples are what Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) would call ‘demand’ images – they all 
involve the subject looking into the camera and establishing some relationship with the 
viewer on the basis of their gaze. With the exception of 3d, after the initial shot of Corbyn at 
0:32 this gaze is accompanied with a smile or a laugh (as in 3e-h). Not only, then, does the 
video showcase the ordinary experiences of British electors, it also replicates the kinds of 
sympathetic relationships the Labour politician might share with them as he travels the 

















Figure 3. “Interview” shots in ‘For the many, not the few’ 
 
Corbyn’s arm as he listens to people’s everyday experiences. Importantly, this curation of 
electors’ quotidian lives affects the way we view the onscreen throngs of his supporters (the 
crowds, those he embraces and with whom he shakes hands); party members  are not 
positioned as separate political fanatics (or ‘cultists’, to use Cohen’s [2017] term), but just 
another group of “ordinary” people who want to share their experiences with the Labour 
politician. If the Morgan Stanley video represented an aggressive left-wing populism, ‘For 
the many, not the few’ is its more positive counterpart; in their curation of apparently 
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authentic British experience, Labour Party communications strategists have created an 
inclusive in-group with which the audience is invited to identify. As in the discussion fo 
PMQs, ‘curation’ is the most appropriate word, here, because the effect of this strategy is to 
position Corbyn and we – the audience of the film – as experts on the authentic lives of the 
struggling demos; their experiences are something ‘only we know’. 
5.2 Corbyn as the object of curation 
The short campaign film, ‘For the many, not the few’, works by positioning Corbyn and the 
Labour Party as the curators of British electors’ everyday lives. Their authenticity is produced 
by this allocentric gesture to the experiences of others, and their expert ability to select and 
profile those experiences. However, the politician’s ethos is not only the product of what he 
says about other people, but of what others say about him. Returning to Andy Burnham’s 
comments at the beginning of the chapter, the Labour leader is often framed as an authentic 
speaker by his political allies and opponents alike. Doubtless this is related not only to the 
strategy of curating the experiences of others and effacing his own, but also the political 
record outlined in Section 2; he has stood in opposition to the political consensus of the last 
three decades – a consensus which has suffered a ‘legitimacy crisis’ (see Habermas, 1976) 
since the 2007/8 crash. For these reasons, he is often introduced as a “man of principle” or 
“straight-talking” (as per his first leadership campaign) before he even speaks at public rallies 
or gives interviews to the press. He is thus himself the subject of curation by other people. 
 These ways of framing the discourse of the Labour leader negate the need for him to 
say explicitly that he is principled, or strongly committed to a set of political beliefs – other 
discourse participants do that rhetorical work for him. However, the projection of an ethos 
onto the Labour leader by those around him can sometimes take unusual and unexpected 
forms. Take, for example, the video entitled ‘Here We Come’. It has received just fewer than 
6500 views. It was released on 1
st
 January, 2018 and is somewhat of a rallying cry to Labour 
activists for the coming year. Chatman’s (1990) model of cinematic narration can likewise be 
used to analyse this broadcast. The auditory channel is similar to ‘For the many, not the few’ 
– it has no onscreen spoken component and features only off-screen commentative music. 
The song selection, though, is very different. Instead of delicate piano and strings, the 
soundtrack is from the 2017 song ‘The Drum’ by the hip-hop duo, The Seige. It features a 
heavy percussion line consisting of a kick drum on the first and third beat of the bar and a 
clap on the second and fourth (later, the clap is joined by a snare drum). The rest of the 
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instrumentation comprises a heavily distorted bass riff played on a synthesiser, a series of 
different synthesiser parts which all fill in the mid-frequencies, a sample of a whooping noise 
and a vocal, which repeats the line ‘here we come’, sometimes with an accompanying grunt 
(‘uh’). In terms of the visual channel, like ‘For the many, not the few’ this broadcast is a 
video montage and the nature of the images are such that they include a variety of different 
locations. Similarly, the people in the footage all represent themselves, rather than actors 
playing roles. Whereas the previous film curated a series of vignettes from voters’ ordinary 
lives, the majority of this film consists of shots from the previous year’s campaigning – 
Corbyn shaking hands, consorting with activists, speaking to large crowds of people, 
doorstepping voters, talking to journalists, and visiting various public service providers 
(schools, hospitals and what appears to be a building site). Insofar as the treatment of the 
image is concerned, the footage is take from the campaign trail so it is “realist” in its 
presentation – there are no filters or enhancements. The editing consists of a series of straight 
cuts, but these are timed to coincide with the music. The first 6 seconds of the video are 
edited in such a way that the first and third beat of the music (the kick drum) is accompanied 
by an image and the second and fourth (the clap) a screen blackout. Then for the next 11 
seconds, the cuts are timed to the music. Throughout this time, there are no words, only 
music. At 0:17, the soundtrack pauses, at which point the footage on the screen is of the 
Labour leader playing football with a young boy. When Corbyn’s foot connects with the ball, 
the music resumes with an added vocal (‘uh, yeah, here we come’), more distorted 
synthesiser parts and the claps are joined by a snare drum. 
 In ‘For the many, not the few’, the lives of apparently ordinary voters were profiled 
and the use of camera angles – particularly the interview-style shots – made it seem as if the 
viewer was travelling the country with the Labour leader to hear people’s life stories. 
Conversely, in this video, the activities of the socialist politician and the crowds who come to 
see him are very much the central subject. The ‘we’ of ‘here we come’ is thus a more 
exclusive ‘we’ than that of the ‘somewhere only we know’, encapsulating only Corbyn, the 
crowds of Labour supporters and the cinematic narrator. Interestingly, despite this apparent 
unity, I would also argue that there is a clash between the ethos of the party leader and the 
agent narrating his activities. Whilst it was aggressive, his populist verbal performance in the 
Morgan Stanley video was also sombre and serious. The mood here, evoked by the brash and 
triumphant music and use of editing, is very different; it is energetic and youthful. The 
presentation of Corbyn’s campaigning activities is thus at some distance from how one might 
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expect the man himself to describe them. For some who are already hostile to the politician, 
this clash between their preconceptions and the proffered representation of the Labour leader 
might cause the video to fail rhetorically (see Browse, 2018) (notably, however, the main 
objection from his political opponents was that the video was threatening and bellicose). It is, 
though, perhaps more interesting to consider why this youthful and “cool” representation of a 
politician – who in the conventional sense of those terms is neither – might succeed (and 
clearly it did for some, at least according to most of the comments under the YouTube video). 
The role of the curator is not only to present material but interpret it in some way. 
Similarly, the cinematic narrator not only curates a series of images of the campaigning 
Labour leader, but also projects onto him an ethos with the semiotic resources at their 
disposal – in this instance, primarily through the hip-hop soundtrack. The ‘we’ of the ‘here 
we come’ lyric is important because it paradoxically facilitates the differentiation of this 
narrator from the socialist politician; whilst signalling an in-group, it also suggests a plurality. 
Compare it to the hypothetical lyric, ‘here I come’, which, in the context of the video, would 
only map onto the party leader. That the ‘we’ who speaks in the song is not reducible to 
Corbyn but a plurality that includes him licenses the apparent dissonance between the 
narrator and the politician’s ethos. The clash is a productive one; the cinematic narrator, 
equipped with the knowledge of The Seige’s musical oeuvre and the cultural cache this 
engenders, proclaims themselves part of the Labour leader’s ‘we’ in-group and in doing so, 
transfers some of that cultural capital to Corbyn. The apparent conflict between the Labour 
leader and cinematic narrator’s ethos are integrated on the basis of the interests they share as 
supporters of Labour’s agenda ‘for the many, not the few’. The curation of the 69-year-old 
democratic socialist by the cinematic narrator of the video as cool and youthful therefore 
proceeds not as result of Corbyn’s personal qualities, but the political movement which he 
represents and with which the cinematic narrator identifies. 
6. Conclusion: “post-truth” or metamodern rhetoric? 
The above analyses situate Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party’s rhetorical strategies for 
performing authenticity – the use of populist language and two forms of what I have called 
‘curated authenticity’ – in the context of the metamodern ‘revenge of history’ (Milne, 2012), 
and the return of depth and affect in cultural production (van den Akker et al, 2017; Gibbons, 
2017; Vermeulen 2015, 2017). Insofar as they link the linguistic and filmic semiotic 
resources used in the YouTube videos to broader social, political and cultural processes, they 
 23 
have provided a critical stylistic perspective on these party political broadcasts. As I outlined 
in the introduction, metamodernism is not the only critical heuristic through which to 
understand the rhetorical style of the socialist politician; journalists have also viewed his 
persuasive appeal through the lens of “post-truth” (e.g. Toynbee, 2016). Assessing the 
analyses above against the two claims central to the discourse on post-truth is an important 
discussion given the relevance of post-truth to contemporary, popular journalistic debate on 
the state of political communication. 
 The first of these claims is that the rhetorical practices of some (post-truth) politicians 
have changed to emphasise appeals to ethos and pathos over more “logical” forms of 
argument, and that they tend to lie, mislead or dissimulate more. None of the videos 
discussed here feature any untruths. Indeed, this is arguably the weakest aspect of the first 
claim. Political discourse in the last century alone has featured antisemitism (Wodak, 1991; 
Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), racism (van Dijk, 1991, 1993a), anti- immigrant, refugee and 
asylum discourse (Philo et al, 2013), homophobia (Durham, 1991; Weeks, 1989), misogyny 
(Ross, 2006; Walsh, 1998) and McCarthyism. Rather than a peripheral feature of the political 
landscape, these discourses and discursive events have often been endorsed by powerful 
institutions and political actors. All have relied on the propagation of falsehood and rumour, 
usually at the expense of a minority group. However, as I have demonstrated above, the 
videos do place a premium on Corbyn’s ethos, either through the straight-talking populist 
style of ‘Bankers like Morgan Stanley should not run our country’, the more inclusive 
allocentric style of ‘For the many, not the few’, or the curation of Corbyn as youthful and 
cool  in ‘Here we come’. Problematically, though, the post-truth discourse does not really 
explain why politicians like Corbyn might use these forms of rhetorical strategy, except to say 
that they resonate with some sections of a demos increasingly polarised by the technological 
processes outlined in the introduction. Certainly, ‘Here we come’ is oriented to such a narrow 
audience, but the curation of experience in ‘For the many, not the few’ represents a much 
more inclusive populism which is oriented to unifying a plurality of voters rather than any 
one “filter bubble” constituency (on ‘pluralist populism’, see Schoor, 2017). Moreover, 
whilst it is aggressively anti-banker, the rhetorical ‘we’ constructed in ‘Bankers like Morgan 
Stanley should not run our country’ is similarly pluralistic. To understand these strategies 
thus requires a more wide-ranging view of the political and social context in which these 
broadcasts are produced and received –a perspective better provided by the metamodern 
‘revenge of history’ and return of depth and affect. Indeed, the aesthetics of ‘depthiness’ 
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(Vermeulen, 2015, 2017) furnishes an explanation for the particular form of curated 
authenticity which is integral to Corbyn’s populist style (note that the argument, here, is not 
that the veteran socialist uses this strategy because of his sensitivity to metamodern 
aesthetics, but that this particular way of speaking resonates with a constituency of voters as a 
result of the contemporary ‘structure of feeling’ [Williams, 1977]). The metamodern 
framework thus provides a more encompassing heuristic for understanding and interpreting 
the Labour leader’s stylistic choices. 
 The second central claim of post-truth discourse is that political audiences have 
‘abandoned conventional criteria of evidence, internal consistency, and fact-seeking’ 
(Lewandowsky et al, 2017: 360). The focus in this chapter has been on connecting Corbyn’s 
rhetorical choices to the wider metamodern political and cultural context, rather than their 
reception by those watching the videos. Audience response studies of the politician’s 
YouTube output would certainly be a productive area of future research (for similar audience-
centred analysis of political discourse, see, Browse 2018, 2019, and Brunsdon and Morley, 
1999). However, the framework used in this chapter does entail a different outlook for future 
work than that presupposed by the literature on post-truth. According to the former 
perspective, the ‘revenge of history’ has engendered a legitimation crisis of political 
institutions (see Habermas, 1976); political audiences have turned away from the traditional 
arbiters of “truth” (journalists, politicians, experts etc.) because they have failed to accurately 
predict, explain or resolve economic crises, stagnation and the precipitous decline in living 
standards this has caused. It is not, then, that audiences have ceased to care about the truth, 
but that official truths have ceased to match lived realities. ‘Post-truth’ is thus a misnomer; it 
is the very inverse of the ideological dynamic suggested by a legitimation crisis. The post-
truth critique places the burden of blame on audiences and also politicians who have hitherto 
been on the margins of political life. From this perspective, post-truth politics is an extrinsic, 
alien feature of the political system – a distortion that can be attributed to demagogues from 
outside (Trump, Corbyn, etc.). Conversely, the argument advanced here is that changes in the 
production and reception of political discourse are system-internal – they are produced by 
legitimation crises that are grounded in the social, economic and political processes 
characterising metamodernity. From a critical linguistic perspective, this argument is more 
satisfactory insofar as it situates discursive practices of production and reception in their 
proper social context. Moreover, rather than involving an implicit defence of powerful 
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institutions to define what counts as true, it rightly targets ‘the power elites that enact, sustain, 
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